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Abstract 
The United States government has several policies and programs designed to increase the 
number of broadcasting stations owned by racial minorities. Increasing the number of 
minority-owned broadcasting stations, the government claims, will diversify the content 
of broadcast programs by increasing the amount of minority-oriented programming. Mi­
nority owners will program their stations differently than white owners, the government 
claims. In this paper we present the first econometric test of these propositions about 
minority ownership of broadcasting stations as well as a number of other related proposi­
tions. vVe conclude that increasing the number of minority-owned broadcasting stations 
increases the amount of minority-oriented programming. We also conclude that increas­
ing the number of female-owned stations-a policy that has been ruled unconstitutional­
would be just as effective at increasing minority-oriented programming. 
TESTING MINORITY PREFERENCES IN 
BROADCASTING* 
Jeffrey A. Dubint Matthew L. Spitzer+ 
1 Introduction 
The United States government has several policies and programs designed to increase the 
number of broadcasting stations owned by racial minorities. Increasing the number of 
minority-owned broadcasting stations, the government claims, will diversify the content 
of broadcast programs by increasing the amount of minority-oriented programming. Mi­
nority owners will program their stations differently than white owners, the government 
claims. 
In this paper we present the first econometric test of these propositions about minority 
ownership of broadcasting stations as well as a number of other related propositions. We 
conclude that increasing the number of minority-owned broadcasting stations increases 
the amount of minority-oriented programming. We also conclude that increasing the 
number of female-owned stations-a policy that has been ruled unconstitutional-would 
be just as effective at increasing minority-oriented programming. 
Section II will present the legal background. Section III presents the testable hy­
potheses and their justifications, while section IV explains our data analysis. Section V 
describes the implications of our work. 
*The authors wish to thank Florence Setzer, Mark Zupan, Jane Halperin, the participants at work­
shops on the paper at the University of Southern California Law Center and participants in a session 
of the 1 992  Telecommunications Policy Research Conference. Research assistance was provided by P. 
Scott Burton, Eric Rosin and Bruce Eisen. 
tnivision of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 9 1 1 25. 
iDivision of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 9 1 1 25. 
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1.1 Legal Background-Licensing 
The Federal Communications Commission licenses all broadcasters in the United States. 
There are two ways to obtain broadcasting licenses: direct grant from the FCC or pur­
chase from a license holder. The FCC grants licenses through two different administrative 
processes-comparative hearing and lottery. 
If more than one qualified applicant applies for a license the FCC may hold a compar­
ative hearing. In such a hearing the applicants' characteristics are compared, ranked, and 
then combined into a choice of the applicant that will best serve the "public interest."1 
According to the FCC two of the most important criteria are diversification of control 
of the mass media and integration of ownership with management.2 The diversification 
of control criterion is supposed to favor applicants with no other ownership interests in 
broadcasting or other media, and has all of the traditional industrial organization jus­
tifications and shortcomings. Integration of ownership with management, on the other 
hand, is much more peculiar. This criterion is supposed to favor applications in which 
the owner promises to work at the broadcasting station and, as such, runs counter to the 
ha.sic approach of most capitalist economies in the world today. Where all of the world's 
stock markets allow those with capita.I to hire talented managers to run corporate ac­
tivities, the FCC favors forcing those who wish to place large amounts of capital into 
broadcasting to also spend time attending to the humdrum, day-to-day running of the 
station. Why do this? The FCC claims that integrating broadcasting owners into the 
management of the stations will produce two valuable effects. First, the FCC has many 
rules, both substantive and procedural, violation of which may result in penalties against 
the licensee. If the owner is running the station, claims the FCC,3 he or she will be more 
likely to ensure that the rules are followed than would a mere manager. Second, the FCC 
has long required broadcasters to serve the "needs and interests" of the station's com­
munity of license.4 If the owner of a broadcast facility lives in the community-something 
which is a.lso favored5-he will be attuned to the needs and interests of the community 
and be more likely to provide programming aimed at serving those needs and interests. 6 
In short, integration of ownership with management is supposed to affect programming 
content. 
The FCC also grants broadcasting licenses-almost exclusively low power television 
licenses-through a lottery. The lottery gives chances to competing applicants and then 
1See Spitzer, "Multicriteria Choice Processes: An Application of Public Choice Theory to Bakke, the 
FCC, and the Courts,"  88 Yale Law Journal 717 ( 1979), for a social choice theoretic analysis of such 
processes. For an introduction to the basic legal processes see D. Ginsburg, M. Botein & M. Director, 
Regulation of Electronic Mass Media, 83-148 (2d ed. 1991). 
2See 1965 Policy Statement, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394-95 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Policy Statement] . 
31965 Policy Statement, supra note 3, at 395-96. 
4See Ginsburg, et al. , supra note 2, at 157. 
51965 Policy Statement, supra note 3, at 395-96 . 
6Id. 
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chooses a winner through a random process similar to the ping-pong ball blower used by 
the California State Lottery. 
Broadcasters can also obtain licenses by purchasing one from an existing license 
holder. The Federal Communications Act in effect requires the FCC to approve most 
purchases by preventing the FCC from considering any potential broadcaster other than 
the buyer. If the buyer is at least minimally acceptable the FCC must approve the 
purchase.7 
1.2 Minority Ownership Preference Policies 
The FCC has four policies designed to increase the ownership of broadcasting licenses by 
racial and ethnic minorities.8 Two of these policies apply to direct grants by the FCC 
and two policies are designed to stimulate purchases by minorities. 
Lottery Preferences: Section 309 (i) of the Federal Communications Act allows the
FCC to grant broadcast licenses through a lottery, and orders the FCC to "establish rules 
and procedures to ensure that, in the administration of any system of random selection 
under this subsection, groups or organizations, or members of groups or organizations, 
which are under represented in the ownership of telecommunications facilities or prop­
erties will be granted significant preferences."9 Under this section "Blacks, Hispanics, 
American Indians, Alaskan Natives, Asians, and Pacific Islanders"10 get extra chances in 
the lottery.11 
747 U.S.C. sec. 310(d)(1988). 
8Moreover, the FCC has adopted an additional preference policy allowing radio companies to buy 
noncontrolling stakes in three additional AM and three additional FM stations (beyond the new limit 
of eighteen of each), if the new stations are minority-owned. See 7 F.C.C. red 6387 ( 1 992) .  
90mnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of  1 981 ,  Public Law No. 97-35, sec. 1 242 ,  95 Stat. 736 , 736-37 
(1 981) (concerning television and radio broadcasting). 
1047 U.S.C. sec. 309(i)(3)(C)(ii)( 1 988). 
11The lottery preference was at first resisted by the FCC. Congress first amended section 309 (i) of 
the Federal Communications Act in 1981 ,  and the Conference Report accompanying the bill stated 
in part: [I] t is the firm intention of the conferees that ownership by minorities, such as Blacks and 
Hispanics, as well as by women, and ownership by other under-represented groups, such as labor unions 
and community organizations, is to be encouraged through the award of significant preferences in any 
such random selection proceeding. These are groups which are inadequately represented in terms of 
nationwide telecommunications ownership, and it is the intention of the conferees in establishing a 
random selection process that the objective of increasing the number of media outlets owned by such 
persons or groups be met. H. R. Rep. No. 208, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. 897 ( 1 981 ) .  The FCC refused 
to implement the scheme, claiming the statute was too vague. Congress responded by amending the 
act the following year to define minority group to include "Blacks, Hispanics, American Indians, Alaska 
Natives, Asians, and Pacific Islanders."  
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Comparative Hearing Preferences: The FCC "enhances"12 applications of mi­
norities who apply for licenses and who are compared with other applicants in hearings. 
The FCC accomplishes this enhancement through modification of the "integration of 
ownership" criterion. First the FCC grants a "quantitative" integration credit which 
describes the extent to which an applicant proposes to work in a broadcast station.13 
The FCC then "enhances" the quantitative integration credit with qualitative factors, 
including the race and ethnicity of the applicant.14 The enhancement is supposed to 
increase minority applicants' chances of victory in comparative hearings. 
The FCC at first resisted granting enhancements for race and ethnicity, 15 claiming 
that the Federal Communications Act is colorblind, but the Court of Appeals reversed 
the FCC and ordered the FCC to grant the enhancements for race. In response the 
FCC began utilizing a comparative hearing preference for minority applicants and then, 
in 1978, adopted three more policies. First, the FCC extended a comparative hearing 
preference-albeit a less important one-to women.16 This preference was struck down 
as unconstitutional in Lamprecht v. FCC, 17 discussed in detail below.18 In addition, 
the FCC adopted two policies designed to spur the purchase of broadcasting stations 
by minorities. These policies were the tax certificate and the distress sale rules, and 
both were justified on the ground that " [f]ull minority participation in the ownership and
management of broadcast facilities results in a more diverse selection of programming."19 
Distress Sales: When there are serious allegations that a licensee has done something 
that renders the licensee unqualified to hold the license the FCC will schedule a hearing. 
Before the start of that hearing the licensee may arrange to sell the license to a minority 
purchaser for not more than 753 of fair market value. Under the distress sale policy the 
minority purchaser may take the license free of the problems that produced the hearing 
in the first place. 20 \i\Thite women may not utilize the distress sale policy. As of 1989 
the FCC claimed that the distress sale policy had been used fewer than forty times.21 In 
12The FCC sometimes uses the term enhancement, West Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 735 
F.2d 601  (D.C. Cir. 1 984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1027 ( 1 985), and sometimes uses "merit," Central Fla. 
Enters. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1 978), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 957 ( 1 979) . 
13Thus, if a sole owner proposed to work four days per week, eight hours per day, at the station, he 
might get 80% quantitative integration credit. 
141 965 Policy Statement, supra note 3, at 396-99, construed in TV 9 v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 
1973), cert denied, 4 19  U.S. 986 ( 1974) .  See also Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 1 10 S. Ct. 2997 (1990),  
discussed in text at notes 38-41 ,  infra. 
15See Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d l(Rev. Bd.), review denied, 37 F.C.C.2d 559 (1972 ) .  
16Mid-Florida Television Corp., 69 F.C.C.2d 607 (1978) ;  Mid-Florida Television Corp., 70 F.C.C.2d 
281,  326 (Rev. Bd. 1 978) .  
17958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1 992) . 
18See text at notes 42-57, infra. 
19Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979, 98 1 ( 1978) 
[hereinafter Minority Ownership Policy]. 
20Minority Ownership Policy, supra note 20, at 983. 
21 FCC Press Release (March 9, 1989) .  
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contrast , the FCC claimed that the tax certificate policy had been used 178 times. 22 
Tax C ertificates: If a broadcasting station is sold to a party "with a significant 
minority interest , " 23 the FCC issues a special certificate that allows the seller to defer 
any capital gain tax that would have been generated by the sale . Depending on the size 
of the tax ,  the deferral may be quite valuable and give the seller a great incentive to seek 
out a minority purchaser and give that purchaser a lower price. Just as with the distress 
sale policy, white female sellers may not utilize the tax certificate program. 
1.3 Court Challenges and the FCC Questionnaire 
Although the minority preference policies have been attacked, defended and evaluated 
in a number of court proceedings, 24 for our purposes the most important events are the 
FCC's  questionnaire , Metro Broadcasting v .  FCC ,25 and Lamprecht v .  FCC . 26 
1.4 Congressional Research Service Report 
While in the middle of a lawsuit attacking the constitutionality of the female preference 
in comparative hearings , 27 the FCC mailed to licensees questionnaires which were to 
be returned to the FCC by April 30, 1987. These questionnaires requested data on 
the licensees ' characteristics , including sex and race , and the station's  programming 
practices , including its choice of programming to targeted audiences . 28 Approximately 
seventy-nine percent of the licensees responded , but the FCC was not allowed to analyze 
the data.  Congress ordered the FCC to use the minority preferences and to stop any 
inquiry aimed at reconsidering the preferences . 29 The data were turned over to the 
22Id. 
23Minority Ownership Policy, supra note 20 ,  at 983. 
24See, e.g., Pappas v. FCC, 807 F.2d 1 0 1 9  (D.C. Cir. 1 986 ) ; West Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC, 735 F.2d 601  (D.C. Cir. 1 984) , cert denied, 470 U.S. 1027 ( 1985) ; Garrett v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1056 
(D.C. Cir. 1 975) ; TV 9 v. FCC, 495 F.2 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973) , cert denied, 4 1 9  U.S. 986 ( 1 974). 
251 10  S. Ct. 2997 ( 1 990 ). 
26958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992) . 
27Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1 192  (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
28See In re Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales and Tax Cer­
tificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, 1 F.C.C.R. 1315 ( 1 986 ) ; Reexami­
nation of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales and Tax Certificate Policies Premised 
on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, 52 Fed. Reg. 596 (FCC 1 987) (notice of inquiry). 
29Congress passed House Joint Resolution 395, which contains the following language: [N]one of the 
funds appropriated by the Act shall be used to repeal, to retroactively apply changes in, or to continue a 
reexamination of, the policies of the Federal Communications Commission with respect to comparative 
licensing, distress sales and tax certificates ... to expand minority and women ownership of broadcasting 
licenses. H.R.J. Res. 395, lOOth Cong., 2d. Sess, 102 Stat. 2 , 2 1 6  ( 1 987) . 
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Congressional Research Service , which " analyzed" the data  and issued a report in 1 987 .  
Because th i s  report represents the only previous extensive empirical examination of the 
connection between race and sex of station owners and programming content , we will 
describe the report in some detail . 30 
The Congressional Research Service ("CRS" ) Report presents many charts and tables 
relating owners ' racial ,  ethnic and sexual characteristics and the programming content of 
the owned broadcasting stations . The FCC survey instrument, reproduced in Appendix 
C, generated responses about programming targeted at Blacks ,  Hispanics , Asian/Pacific 
Islanders , and Indian/ Alaskan natives , on both a primary or special basis .  In addition, 
the survey asked radio stations for their formats .  31 
Based on simple cross-tabulations of ownership percentage and the percentage of 
programming for various target groups ,  the CRS tentatively reached several conclusions :  
1. station ownership, in part or in whole, by a particular type of minority, tended to
increase the amount of programming targeted at that minority ; 32
2 .  station ownership by a particular type of minority, such as Black , also tended to in­
crease the amount of programming targeted at other minorities , such as Hispanic ; 33 
3. station ownership by women produces a small increase in programming for women
when compared to the increase in programming that minority owners provide to
minorities . 34 The CRS equivocated on the question of whether women owners
programmed for minority audiences at a higher rate than do males . 35
30There are some studies of quite limited scope on the issue. See Spitzer, "Justifying Minority Pref­
erences in Broadcasting," 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 334-36 ( 199 1)  [hereinafter "Justifying Minority
Preferences" ] (reviewing the studies). There are also some data testing the basic theory of programmer
choice. See id. at 318-19 . None of these studies includes demographic data from the broadcasting 
markets and data on owners' race and sex. 
31 A typical CRS Report chart, found in CRS Report, page 2 1, Figure 1 2 ,  is reproduced in Appendix 
A. 
32"Nevertheless, these data indicate that certain conditions in ownership and in programming exist 
which suggest a positive relationship between minority broadcast station ownership and minority pro­
gramming. That is, where minority ownership was found to exist among stations, that group of stations 
programmed proportionately more to their own minority audiences as well as to other minority audiences 
than did those stations with no minority owners." CRS Report at 42 .  
33Id. See also CRS Report at 22 ,  second paragraph. 
34"Stations with women owners program to female audiences, but not to the degree that stations with 
minority owners program to their own minority audience groups." CRS Report at 44. 
35 "While stations with women owners lag slightly behind those with minority owners in programming 
for minorities generally, a substantial percentage programs for Blacks and Hispanic audiences. In the 
group of stations with women owners, there may also be a mix of minority male and female owners." 
CRS Report at 44. 
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The CRS did not include any variables to control for market characteristics .  First , 
the FCC survey instrument failed to ask the broadcasters for demographic data about 
their broadcast area. Second, the CRS concluded that it was impossible , within the t ime 
constraints  placed on them, to add demographic data to the survey data.  The FCC 
survey instrument asked the broadcaster to state i ts  county, rather than its  FIPS code. 
There were , the CRS claimed, more than 1 ,000 responses with misspelled or abbreviated 
names that did not match the county names in the Census data set s .  36 Hence, merging 
census data could not be done. An effort to utilize data on the Arbitron market area 
( "Area of Dominant Influence" or "ADI" ) in which each station operates foundered on 
two problems.  Almost half of the survey responses contained no ADI code, and the CRS 
had no source of demographic data for the ADl' s .  For all of these reasons ,  the CRS 
decided to present the data in charts such as the one reproduced in Appendix A . 37 
In addition , for reasons not addressed in the CRS Report , the CRS failed to analyze 
any models of broadcasting markets .  As a consequence the CRS did not test hypotheses , 
derived from models , about the variables in the survey. Our analysis below corrects for 
this deficiency. 
1.5 Metro Broadcasting 
In 1 990 the Supreme Court issued its Metro Broadcasting decision , upholding the mi­
nority preference in comparative hearings and the distress sale policies against the claim 
that they violated equal protection under the fifth amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, held that federal regulations 
including "benign" racial classifications would pass equal protection analysis if the regu-
36 As we show below, only 310 responses were problematic. 
37The CRS attempted to make up for this failure by examining five large markets (New York, NY;
Dallas, TX; Los Angeles, CA; Chicago, IL; and Atlanta, GA) and five small markets (Flagstaff, AZ;
Elmira, NY; Meridian, Ml; Butte, MT; and LaCrosse, WI) . For each station within each market the
CRS used the station market contour maps published in the TV and Cable Factbook to determine the 
area of coverage. Because the CRS's description of just what it did next is a bit ambiguous, we quote it 
in full at this point: In this publication [TV and Cable Factbook] , markets are defined by home market 
areas plus any surrounding counties, whether located in the same State or in adjoining States, in which 
the stations have a circulation of 50 percent or more. Data from the FCC survey on minority ownership 
and minority programming for all the counties in each sample, in which the 50 percent circulation 
existed, were then arrayed into two sets of matrices (one for each group) and the results, aggregated
for all centers in each sample, were compared for differences between degrees of ownership of these 
stations and minority programming carried on by these same stations in these two groups. Then, the 
aggregate minority population rate (the minority percentage of the total population) for each minority
programming target group in the two selections was overlaid on the minority programming percentages 
to determine whether the programming was more than, less than, or the same as the minority population 
proportions of the market. CRS Report at 3. This methodology appears to try to separate large and 
small markets, but suffers from having so few data points that it has no statistical power or meaning. 
Our approach, described in text below, greatly improves on the CRS approach. 
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lations "serve important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives . " 38 Applying this test , Justice 
Brennan first found that "programming diversity" is an important governmental interest 
potentially sufficient to satisfy the first part of the test . 39 Next , Justice Brennan pro­
ceeded to give Congress and the FCC every possible benefit of the doubt in order to find 
a "substantial relat ionship" between programming diversity and minority ownership .40 
The Court refused to examine the facts behind FCC policies , refused to question Con­
gressional findings , and characterized legislative history in a very deferential fashion . 41 
In such a setting the FCC' s  data  set that was analyzed in the CRS report was mentioned, 
but did not take center stage. In contrast , the CRS report i s  the focus of the most recent 
court decision . 
1.6 Lamprecht v. Federal Communications Commission 
In Lamprecht v. FCC42 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals struck down 
the comparative hearing preference for women, holding that the preference was insuffi­
ciently effective at producing diversity of programming. Judge Clarence Thomas , writing 
for the District Court in his last opinion before being elevated to the Supreme Court , 
reviewed the evidence contained in the CRS Report and concluded that female ownership 
altered programming content very little. 
Jerome Lamprecht , Barbara Marmet , and two other applicants had all applied for the 
same radio broadcasting license . 43 The FCC ultimately awarded the station to Marmet , 
in no small part because of her sex, and Lamprecht appealed , claiming that the fe­
male preference in comparative hearings violated the equal protection clause of the Fifth 
38Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997,  3009 ( 1 990). 
39Id. at 3, 0 1 0 .  Justice Brennan linked his conclusion to "scarcity" analysis in broadcasting. Traditional 
scarcity analysis runs something like the following: unlike other modes of communication, radio spectrum 
is plagued by scarcity-the tendency to interference. In order to prevent chaos of the airwaves (where 
all broadcast and none can be received) the government must license only a few. But the few licensees 
must hold their licenses as trustees for the general public. Because the public is diverse and has diverse 
needs and interests, broadcasters may be regulated in such a way as to produce diverse programming. 
Scarcity analysis has by now fallen into disrepute with almost everyone except the Supreme Court. See 
generally Spitzer, "The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasting," 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 990 ( 1989). In 
addition, the Court could have concluded that diversity of programming was an important governmental 
interest without relying on scarcity. See Spitzer, "Justifying Minority Preferences," supra note 31,  at 
1 59 .  
40See Spitzer, "Justifying Minority Preferences," supra note 31 ,  at 350-52 . 
41 Id. at 350-54 . The dissent disagreed on virtually every aspect of the majority opinion, but would 
not have spent much time examining the facts, either. The dissent was very skeptical of any racial 
classification. Id. at 354-57. 
42958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1 992). 
43The station is to operate out of Middletown, Maryland. Id. at 386 .  
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Amendment .44 
Judge Thomas applied intermediate scrutiny to the female preference policies : " 'be­
nign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress ' do not violate the Fifth Amendment 
if 'they serve important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives . "  '45 Because all parties agreed 
Metro Broadcasting established that the promotion of diverse programming on the radio 
qualifies as an important governmental objective within the power of Congress , 46 the only 
remaining issue was whether the female preference policy was "substantially related" to 
establi shing diversity of programming. 
Judge Thomas explained that the Supreme Court has repeatedly required strong em­
pirical support for regulations claimed to substantially advance governmental interests . 47 
"Any 'predictive judgments '  concerning group behavior and the differences in behavior 
among different groups must at the very least be sustained by meaningful evidence . " 48 
Hence , Judge Thomas proceeded to evaluate the evidence supporting the contention that 
selecting station owners on the basis of sex substantially increases diversity of program­
ming. In particular ,  Judge Thomas asked if female station owners are more likely to 
broadcast "women's programming" than are white male station owners . 49 
The CRS Report represented the only study, in Judge Thomas ' eyes ,  that had the 
potential of resolving the pivotal issue. 50 Judge Thomas created ten tables from the mate­
rial contained in the CRS Report , and used the ten tables to show that female ownership 
of broadcasting stations is insufficiently effect ive at producing diverse programming. 51 
Based on these tables Judge Thomas found that , of stations owned primarily by 
women, approximately 35% reported broadcasting women's  programming, while 28% of 
the stations owned by men reported doing so. In contrast , 79% of Black-owned stat ions 
reported programming for Blacks , as opposed to only 20% of stations owned by non­
Blacks doing so . And similar statistics showed increases of 1 0% to 74% for Hispanic 
owners , of 3% to 25% for Asian/Pacific Islander owners ,  and 4% to 46% for Indian or 
44The court refused to consider independent arguments raised by one of the other applicants who had 
intervened in the Lamprecht case because the filings were late. Id. at 389. 
451d. at 39 1 ,  quoting from Metro Broadcasting. 
46 Although not explicitly mentioned in the opinion, everyone seemed to agree that the female prefer-
ence policy was "benign." 
471d. at 392. 
481d. at 393 (relying on Metro Broadcasting). 
49Judge Thomas refused to address two prior issues: (1)  is there such a thing as "women's program­
ming"? and (2) is women's programming underrepresented? Judge Thomas believed that the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Metro Broadcasting had answered the first question "yes." As to the second question, 
Judge Thomas believed it unnecessary to address it in light of the disposition of the issue discussed in 
text. See id. at 395. 
501d. at 395-96. 
51 Id. at 399-402; these tables are reproduced in their entirety in Appendix B. 
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Alaskan owners . The percentage increase of targeted programming was only 25% for 
women (28%) ( 1 . 25 )  = 35% , while for the other groups it was far higher . 
Judge Thomas also emphasized other evidence in the CRS Report , including the 
observation that stations in which women have a minority ( 1  % to 50%) interest are 
just as likely to broadcast women's programming as are stations with a majority female 
ownership ,  while increasing ownership shares seems to produce increasing targeted pro­
gramming for Indian or Alaskan owners ; 52 in five large cities (New York, Los Angeles ,  
Chicago , Dallas and Atlanta) stations with any racial or ethnic  minority ownership were 
more likely to program women 's programming than were stations with female owners ; 53 
female owners tended to use the same formats as non-minority owners ; 54 and female 
station owners were not much more likely to program for minority audiences than were 
male owners . 55 
While the evidence for the minority preferences was strong enough to support their 
constitutionality, the evidence for the female comparat ive hearing preference was too 
weak . The nature of equal protection analysis requires judges to draw lines , Judge 
Thomas noted, and intermediate scrutiny requires judges to draw lines between policies 
with moderately strong and moderately weak support . The female preference policy fell 
on the weak side of the line56 and was struck down as unconstitutional . 
Judge Buckley, concurring with Judge Thomas , agreed that the CRS Report provided 
the most probative factual evidence on the relationship between female ownership and 
diversity of programming, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the female 
comparative hearing preference. 57 
52Id. at 397.  
53Id. 
54Id. 
55Id. at 397-98 .  
56Id. at 398 ,  note 9 .  
57Judge Buckley also discussed, at length, the leak of a draft of the opinions in  the case to  The Legal 
Times. Judge Buckley presumed that one of the law clerks leaked a draft copy of the opinions, and called 
for a formal investigation to find the source of the leaks. Id. at 403-04.  Judge Mikva, dissenting, disagreed 
with virtually every aspect of the majority opinion. Starting from the highly debatable jurisprudential 
proposition that "as appellate judges, our duty is to follow Supreme Court precedents, not to anticipate 
them," id. at 404, Mikva thoroughly reviewed the import of the Metro Broadcasting case. Mikva 
characterized (quite correctly, in our opinion) the Metro majority opinion as extremely deferential to 
Congressional "factual" claims supporting the minority preference policies. If the Circuit Court had 
afforded Congress the same degree of deference in Lamprecht as the Supreme Court accorded Congress 
in Metro Broadcasting, the female preferences would probably have been upheld. 
We will not discuss the Mikva opinion in detail, in part because it was a dissent, and in part because 
it renders factual evidence as marginally irrelevant. 
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2 Market-Oriented Hypotheses 
There are , to our knowledge, no models of program choice by competitive broadcasters 
that incorporate the race of the owner into the model. There are, however, a significant 
number of models of competitive broadcasters-models that utilize the standard assump­
tion of profit-maximizing behavior by owners . 58 One of us has reviewed these models at 
length elsewhere , 59 and no good purpose would be served by reviewing them again here . 
Instead, we will point out that they can be modified to include the race of broadcasting 
owners , and when this is done we get the following testable hypotheses : 
Hypoth esis 1: We should observe more minority-oriented programming in markets 
with larger minority audiences . 
Hypothesis 2: We should observe more minority-oriented programming in markets 
with large numbers of radio stat ions . 
Hypoth esis 3: Minority owners will be more likely to broadcast minority-oriented 
material . 
Hypothesis 3.1: Hispanic owners will be more likely to program in Spanish . 
Hypothesis 3.2: Black stat ion owners will be more likely to program for the B lack 
audience. 
Hypothesis 3.3: Asian/Pacific Islander owners will be more likely to program for 
Asians/Pacific Islanders . 
Hypothesis 3.4: Female owners will be more likely to program for the female audience. 
Hypothesis 4(a): Minority or female owners will be less likely to provide minority­
oriented programming if such programming is  offered by others in the market . 
58See Steiner, "Program Patterns and Preferences and the Workability of Competition in Radio Broad­
casting," 66 Quarterly Journal of Economics. , 194 (1952); Spence & Owen, "Television Programming, 
Monopolistic Competition, and Welfare," 9 1  Quarterly Journal of Economics., 103  ( 1 977); Rothenberg, 
"Consumer Sovereignty and the Economics of TV Programming," 4 Stud. Pub. Comm., 45 ( 1962) ;  
Wiles, "Pilkington and the Theory of Value," 73 Economics Journal, 183 ( 1963) ;  Beebe, "Institutional 
Structure and Program Choices in Television Markets," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1 5  ( 1 977); 
Wildman & Owen, "Program Competition, Diversity, and Multichannel Bundling in the New Video In­
dustry," in Video Media Competition: Regulation, Economics, and Technology 244 (E. Noam ed., 1 985);
Noam, "A Public and Private-Choice Model of Broadcasting," 55 Publishers Choice, 163 ( 1 987); Garber, 
"The Economics and Political Economy of Broadcasting: Challenges in Developing an Analytic Foun­
dation," 55 Publishers Choice, 189  ( 1 987). See also B. Owen & S. Wildman, Video Economics, 1 0 1 -50 
( 1992). 
59See "Justifying Minority Preferences," supra note 31,  at 304-18 .  
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Hypothesis 4 (b ) : Minority or female owners will be more likely to provide minority­
oriented programming if such programming is offered by others in the market . 
Hypothesis 5: The more minority owners of broadcasting stations are integrated into 
the management of the stations , the more minority-oriented programming will be offered. 
Hypothesis 6:  The stations acquired through the minority preference policies (distress 
sale , comparative hearing preference , tax certificate) will program in the same way that 
other stations program. 
Hypothesis 7: Increasing the number of stations owned by a particular minority in a 
market will increase the total amount of programming for that minority in the market . 
Hypothesis 1 follows directly from any rudimentary theory of demand, while Hy­
pothesis 2 follows from observing that increasing the number of broadcasting stations in 
any market fractionates the audience , and allows stations to "do well" with a smaller 
percentage of the market audience-"minority-oriented programming. "  Hypothesis 3 and 
its subhypotheses can be explained in either of two ways.  Women and minorities might 
consume by broadcasting to their own groups, even at the expense of profit. Alterna­
tively, women and minorities might have production cost advantages at broadcasting to 
their own groups . Minorities might have special knowledge about the demand for broad­
casting in their own markets that is unavailable to outsiders .  Ethnicity provides many 
barriers of language and custom that mainstream, white owners would have to work hard 
to overcome in order to monitor and understand the station's  performance. We would 
expect these barriers to be strongest for non-English broadcasts ,  but significant for Black 
community broadcasting. Women, on the other hand , would likely have smaller cost 
advantages over men than minorities have over whites . Women are dispersed throughout 
society, are found in virtually all social settings , speak the same languages that men 
speak, and so forth.  In addition, it is not clear exactly what constitutes women's pro­
gramming. For the purposes of Hypothesis 3.5, we presume that there is something in the 
set of "women's programming, " 60 and that women have some advantage at programming 
it . 
Hypotheses 4 ( a) and 4 (b ) represent the conflicting role that provision of minority-
60See id. at 330-31 (including "programs geared to the special biological concerns of women," "special 
social and economic concerns of women," and [s]ome entertainment programming" in women's program­
ming) . Judge Buckley and Judge Mikva sparred over the question of whether there might be a special 
female "point of view." If this were true, female owners might program the same types of material, but 
with a different slant, than would men. Judge Buckley conceded that this might be true, but that there 
was no evidence to support it. Buckley concurrence at page 403. Mikva disagreed. For the purposes of 
our article we will presume that female owners regarded programming the same type of program (e.g., 
news), but with a distinctly female point of view a s  programming for women and reported it as such 
on the questionnaire. To the extent that this is not true, the questionnaire failed to elicit some relevant 
data which in turn should produce smaller coefficients for the "PRIFEM" variable discussed below. 
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oriented programming by other stations in the market plays in the analysis. On the 
one hand (Hypothesis 4 (  a)) , if a first stat ion is already providing a particular type of 
minority programming, then an additional station providing that type of minority pro­
gramming would have to split the minority audience with the first station. On the other 
hand (Hypothesis 4 (b) ) , if a first station is already providing a particular type of mi­
nority programming, then an additional station could regard that as a signal that the 
market contains significant numbers of listeners or viewers interested in that type of 
programming. 
Hypothesis 5 reflects the FCC's  theory that integration of ownership and management 
affects content , while Hypothesis 6 represents the standard economic presumption of the 
irrelevance of sunk costs . 
Hypothesis 7 stems from the question whether minority-oriented programming from 
an additional minority owner will replace or supplement existing minority-oriented pro­
gramming from other owners in that market . In other words , if a new minority owner 
begins broadcasting minority-oriented programming, will another stat ion in that market 
stop broadcasting minority-oriented programming, or will the new source of minority­
oriented programming increase the total in the market? 
3 Our Data Analysis 
This section provides the first systematic, statistical test of the hypotheses about the 
relationship between broadcasting stations , market characteristics ,  and owners '  charac­
teristics . We added demographic data about broadcasting markets to the data  in the FCC 
survey and then conducted regressions and tests of  significance. A detailed description 
of the data and our results follows . 
3.1 The Data 
Data from the minority ownership survey arrived in nine informix files . Several programs 
were written to extract the information from these files , to handle the coding of missing 
data, and so forth.  The combined processed file contained 8, 720 observations for 9 1  
separate variables . Of  the 8 ,  720 observations 1 ,227 cases were eliminated because they 
were responses for TV rather than radio stations . This left a total of 7 ,493 cases . By far, 
the most difficult data processing step was the matching of social economic data to  the 
minority ownership survey file. For each observation of the minority ownership survey, 
a county and state was recorded by the respondent . We used the county and city data 
file from the U . S .  Census in an attempt to match county and city data  to the survey. 
Of the 7,493 observations , 3 1 0  observations could not be matched because the recorded 
1 3  
state and county information in the minority ownership survey did not correspond to a 
valid state/county pair in the census bureau data. These 3 1 0  cases did not match the 
U . S .  Census data because of miscoding and misspellings of the county information. In 
some cases respondents entered the city rather than a county, and in other cases the 
county information or county was misspelled. We selected these 3 1 0  cases for further 
examination .  We were able to map the misspellings or cities into correctly spelled county 
information in almost all cases.61 Of the 7,493 potential cases , 3 1  in the end could not 
be matched due to insufficient state and county information . And, lacking the relevant 
hard copies of the survey, it was impossible to assign state and county information to 
these cases . Therefore , there are 7 ,462 radio stat ions for which it i s  possible to merge 
city and county information , and these 7,462 complete cases remain as the basis for our 
analysi s .  
We have included in Appendix C the full text of the minority ownership survey in  
the format in  which it was given to respondents .  Using responses to the survey we have 
created a number of variables to test the hypotheses summarized above. These variables 
can be grouped into six categories . The first category represents ownership percentages 
by distinct minority groups .  The second category represents the presence or absence of 
special circumstances that applied when the respondents acquired their licenses . The 
third category contains the social economic information merged from the county and city 
data source . The fourth category contains some characterizations of the market which we 
were able to construct by looking across all radio stations within a given county. The fifth 
category contains the descriptors for whether the owner/manager of a given radio station 
was of a particular minority group . And the last category contains our coding for the 
dependent variables of the analysi s ,  which are the format and audience characterizations . 
In Table 1 we present the variable mnemonics , descriptions and source information­
usually responses to a specific question in the FCC survey reproduced in Appendix C .  
Starting with the ownership variables , we have constructed variables for Black owner­
ship between ten and 20 percent , 20 and 50 percent , and 50 percent or above. Simi­
larly, we have constructed variables for the other minority groups-Hispanic ,  American­
Indian/ Alaskan and Asian/Pacific Islander . In each of these cases we used 10% ownership 
as a threshold for significant ownership .  We used a 20% ownership break because FCC 
rules allow a limited partnership with a minority general partner with more than 20% 
equity to count as  a "minority" owner .62 We used a 50% figure because that is where 
the minority owners gain legal control . For female ownership we refrained from breaking 
the data at 20% because there is no rule for limited partnerships with female general 
partners that is analogous to the rule for minorities . 
61In cases where the respondent answered with a city/state pair rather than a county/state pair, we 
were able to assign the correct county using the Township Atlas of the United States, Andriot Associates, 
McLean, Virginia, 1979; compiled and edited by John L. Andriot." 
62See In re Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in Broadcasting, 
92  F.C.C.2d 849 ,  855 ( 1982). 
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We also used continuous variables representing any minority or female ownership .  
Thus OWNB indicates the percent of Black ownership .  
I n  the second group of variables we created indicators for  licenses that were acquired as 
distress sales (DIS ) ,  with comparative hearing preferences (PRE) , or with tax certificates 
(TAX) . The variable NCOM indicates the class of service for the radio station; i .e . , 
whether commercial or non-commercial .  
The next group of variables , PERBLK,  PERSPA ,  and PERASI ,  measure the per­
centage of the resident population which respectively are Black, speak Spanish, or are 
Asian/Pacific Islander . This is the data matched from the U . S .  Census at the county 
level. We also have created a set of variables to describe the scope of the market , in­
cluding RSTA,  which is the number of radio stations in the county, and PRSTABLK,  
PRSTASPA ,  and PRSTAASI .  These are , respectively, the percentage of stations , exclud­
ing that of the respondent , which have a Black , Spanish or Asian programming format , as 
indicated by question G on the survey. PERSTABLK, PRSTASPA , and PRSTAASI are 
defined to net out the contribution from the respondent ' s  actual choice. These variables 
thus measure the percentage of other stations that broadcast to a certain minority group , 
and are appropriate for characterizing the market conditions before the respondent 's  pro­
gramming choice in a way which is exogenous to the choice made by the respondent . We 
have also created five indicator variables , BLAOM, SPAOM, ASIOM, FOM, and OM 
to represent Black owner-managers , Hispanic owner-managers ,  Asian owner-managers , 
female owner-managers , and all owner-managers . We defined a minority owner-manager 
as being a manager who falls into a specific minority group , who works at least half time 
(20 to 39 hours per week) and who owns at least ten percent of the radio station. 
For the dependent variables we used information from questions G and H. Question 
G allows us to identify stations that program a specific format . In particular , we define 
variables B LKFOR, SPAFOR, and ASIFOR to identify which radio stat ions have Black 
format , Spanish format , and Asian format ,63 respectively. Using question H ,  we are also 
able to identify which respondents thought that their primary audience targeted by the 
programming was Black , Spanish, or Asian .  We identified these variables as PRIBLA,  
PRISPA ,  and PRIASI ,  respectively. We also used question H to identify those stations 
which have primarily female (PRIFEM) or American Indian (PRIAM!) programming.64 
63Use of the survey response for other foreign language as Asian format is questionable. There are 
some stations, particularly in New York and Chicago, that broadcast in languages that are not English, 
Spanish or any Asian language. However, we suspect that there are relatively few such stations. In 
addition, we get some positive results between Asian ownership and this variable. See discussion in text, 
below. 
64To check the plausibility of the survey responses in regard to the self-assessed measures of minority 
programming we analyzed another measure of audience composition. First, we identified the Arbitron 
market for individual FCC survey responses and selected the responses from all 51 Arbitron markets 
for which we had comparative data. (These 51 Arbitron markets tend to be among the largest, and 
include all of the top 20 markets.) Then, for the 51 Arbitron markets, we calculated (using FCC survey 
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The descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in Table 2. In this table we 
separate the discrete indicator variables from the continuous variables and simply record 
the number of radio stations for which the indicator is true for the discrete variables , and 
provide the range and average values for the continuous variables . 
Table 2 shows that 308 stations have some significant Black ownership ,  1 29 have 
some significant Spanish ownership , 53 have some significant American Indian ownership , 
and 29 have some significant Asian ownership . 1 , 740 stations have between ten and 50 
percent female ownership and an additional 920 have over 50 percent female ownership .  
Taken together , 2 , 660 of  the 7,462 radio stations have some significant female ownership .  
Licenses were acquired by 5 1  stations based on distress sales , 72 stat ions acquired licenses 
based on preference hearings and 63 acquired licenses based on tax certificates .  Of the 
7 ,462 radio stat ions , 2 ,412  were noncommercial . 9 1  stations had Black owner-managers , 
while 49 stations had Hispanic owner-managers , 643 had female owner-managers and only 
2 stations had Asian owner-managers . In total ,  3 , 1 1 3  had some type of owner-manager .  
With respect to the distribution of the format and audience variables , 810 stations had 
formats for Blacks , 482 had formats for Spanish, and 3 1 6  had formats for Asians . 
In terms of primary audience , 905 stations view themselves as having primarily Black 
audiences , 426 Spanish audiences , 85 primarily Asian audiences , 1 ,369 primarily female 
audiences , and 123 primarily American Indian audiences. 
The continuous variables show that the percentage of Blacks in the counties range 
from as low as 0 to as high 84 percent , with a county-wide average of 1 3. 6  percent Blacks ,  
8 . 53  percent Spanish , and 2 .  7 8  percent Asian .  65 Counties contain from 1 to 7 4 radio 
stat ions , with an average of 10 . 4  radio stations per county. Ten percent of the radio 
stations (excluding that of the respondent ) have a Black format , 6 percent a Spanish 
format , and 4 percent an Asian format . 
For the format and primary audience variables we have not used the information con-
response data) the percentage of stations that programmed primarily for Blacks or Hispanics within each 
Arbitron market. Then we took information from Arbitron Ratings: Radio Ethnic Composition Report 
(Summer 1 986) for the identical 51 Arbitron markets. The Ethnic Composition Report reports on the 
percentage of Black or Hispanic listeners for radio stations in any market having at least 1 0% Black 
or Hispanic population. Using the definition that when a station's audience was over 50 percent Black 
or Hispanic, we classified radio stations into primary Black or primary Hispanic stations. For the 51 
markets in which we could make the comparison, we found that the Arbitron data show that 12. 7 percent 
of radio stations have a Black format. The corresponding data from the FCC survey shows that 1 1.6 
percent of the stations primarily target Black listeners. The Arbitron data shows that 7.1 percent of the 
stations have a predominantly Hispanic audience, while the FCC survey shows that 7.8 percent of the 
stations target Hispanics. In neither case is the paired comparison of means significantly different from 
one another. This comparison indicates that the survey responses are likely to be unbiased measures of 
audience composition. 
65Table 2 presents the non county-wide percentages for Blacks, Spanish, and Asian of 9 .83 percent, 
3.89 percent, and 1.15 percent, respectively. 
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tained in the survey indicating whether the number of hours of programming exceeded 
20 rather than being between 1 and 1 9 .  Instead we simply record the information dis­
cretely that a radio stat ion has a Black format or has a primary audience which is Black , 
regardless of the number of hours . For example , if a respondent in Question G checked 
1 7  (Spanish) in either the 20+ Hours category or in the 1- 1 9  Hours category, we regarded 
that as a Spanish format . Had the gradations in the number of hours of programming 
been finer it may have been appropriate to attempt to explain the number of hours of a 
particular type of programming conducted by the station . 
The survey did not elicit very precise information on the number of hours of pro­
gramming and ,  therefore, we chose to model simply the discrete choice by the station of 
its programming formats and primary audience . Since these latter variables are discrete, 
taking on the values 0 and 1 to represent the presence of a certain kind of format or its 
absence by a radio station ,  we use a binary logit model to estimate the probability that 
a stat ion chooses to provide a given type of format .66 
3.2 Results 
In Table 4 we specify the logistic probability model for format and primary audience 
programming as a function of the variables described. In particular , we present a series 
of similar specifications across the programming choices , wherein we relate the choice 
by a radio station to provide a given type of minority format or primary audience pro­
gramming to the ownership composit ions , the presence or absence of special programs 
by which the license had been acquired ,  the commercial status, the presence of minor­
ity owner-managers ,  and number and percentage of radio stations present in the market 
who also programmed a particular format . Each specification contains the identical set 
of explanatory variables so that we can examine the effect of Black ownership on Black 
programming, the effect of Hispanic ownership on Spanish programming, as well as the 
effect of Black ownership on Spanish programming. Therefore , we do not rule out a priori 
patterns of correlat ion in the choices and the patterns of significance wherein minority 
ownership can lead to lower probability of programming for another minority group . In 
table 4 we report the coefficient and indicate which coefficients were significant at the 
5 percent significance level. These are shown with double asterisks . Where coefficients 
were significant at the 1 0  percent significance level we use one asterisk. The 8 columns 
of the table are , respectively, Black format , primary Black audience, Spanish format , 
primary Spanish audience, Asian format , primary Asian audience , primary female , and 
primary American Indian audience . 
We are primarily interested in the pattern of effects of the variables in these ta-
66See, e.g., McFadden, "Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior," in Frontiers in 
Econometrics, 105 (P. Zarembka ed.,  1973), for examples of the multinomial logit model. 
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bles . Starting with the ownership percentage , we find that Black formatting and Black 
programming are significantly affected by Black ownership . OWNB ,  the variable that 
represents any significant degree of Black ownership significantly affects the format and 
primary target audience of the radio station. Black ownership also significantly increases 
the likelihood of programming in Spanish and of targeting females . Spanish ownership 
at any significant level has a significant impact on Spanish programming. The vari­
able which represents Asian ownership , OWN A ,  significantly affects only the tendency of 
stations to use an Asian format , and not the tendency to target Asian listeners .67 Inter­
estingly, female ownership has a significant impact on Black programming, on Spanish 
programming, 68 on targeting Asian listeners , 69 on targeting female listeners , and a signif­
icant impact on American Indian programming. Therefore, the pattern of results in these 
tables suggests that , while Black ,  Spanish and American Indian ownership significantly 
affect the programming for those minority groups ,  a higher degree of female ownership 
leads to a significantly more diverse set of programming for minorities, generally. 
It would be reasonable to conclude that the hypothesis that minority ownership affects 
minority programming (Hypothesis 3 )  is generally accepted . More particularly, Hypothe­
ses 3 . 1  (Hispanic) , 3 . 2  (Black) and 3 . 4  (female) are all confirmed-Hispanic owners are 
more likely to program Spanish formats and target Hispanic listeners ; Black owners are 
more likely to program Black formats and target Black listeners ; and female owners are 
more likely to program women 's formats and target women. Only Hypothesis 3 . 3  -that 
Asian/Pacific Islander owners will be more likely to program for Asian/Pacific Islanders­
is left in uncertain status .  It is important to remember that we have controlled in these 
regressions for the audience composit ion and that the audience composit ion itself s ignif­
icantly and sensibly influences the format and programming types . For example, as the 
percentage of Black population represented in the radio station ' s  home county increases , 
the probability that either the format of the radio station will be Black or the targeted 
audience is primarily Black increases significantly. As the percentage of Hispanic popu­
lation increases , the likelihood both of Spanish programming and of targeting Hispanic 
listeners increases . Also , as the percentage of Asian population in the county increases , 
we find both more Asian format programming and more targeting of Asian listeners . In 
some cases , there are cross effects as well . For example, as the percentage of Blacks in 
the county increases , a broadcaster tends to provide more programming for Blacks and 
less programming for all other types . Similarly, as the percentage of Hispanics increases , 
less programming is provided for Blacks and females . Taken together these results show 
that the composition of the audience causes a direct form of competit ion for format and 
subject matter during airplay, thereby confirming Hypothesis 1 .  
To test Hypothesis 7-that increasing minority ownership will lead to increases i n  mi­
nority programming in the market-we examined whether increases in minority ownership 
67 Asian owners also tend to target Hispanics and to program in Spanish. 
680WNF has no significant effect on targeting Spanish listeners, however. 
690WNF has no significant effect on asian formatting, however. 
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result in net increases in the amount of minority programming in the market , or whether 
minority-owned stations increase their likelihood of minority programming at the ex­
pense or other stations .  We aggregated the FCC and census data to the county/state 
level and constructed, for Blacks and Hispanics , aggregate measures for the percentage 
of minorities in the population, the percentage of noncommercial stat ions in the market , 
and the percentage of minority-owned stations .  We ran tobit estimations , with aggregate 
percentage of minority format radio stations as the dependent variable . As the results 
from table 5 show, increasing the percentage of minority-owned stat ions in a market 
significantly (at 1 0%)  increases the percentage of minority format radio stat ions in the 
market . Thus ,  Hypothesis 7 seems to be confirmed .  
Ownership characteristics can increase the  likelihood that a broadcaster will provide 
a specific type of minority format beyond that which we would expect from audience 
demands , but minority owners are not less likely to provide programming for other mi­
nority groups .  Therefore , we tentatively conclude that even after controlling for the 
composit ion of the market , a policy which stimulates and encourages minority ownership 
of broadcasting stations produces additional programming for minority groups . Further , 
such a policy does not seem to reduce the amount of programming for any particular 
minority group below that which is called for in the marketplace; i . e . , as demanded by 
the composition of minorities in the market . 
The pattern of effects for the number of stations is mixed . Taken together it would 
be difficult to conclude that markets with more radio stations or fewer radio stations 
lead to a certain type of minority programming; consequently, Hypothesis 2 cannot be 
confirmed .  What is clear , however , is  that a percentage of other stations broadcasting 
a certain minority type of programming significantly influences additional programming 
of that minority type .  We find ,  through the variables PRSTABLK,  PRSTASPA , and 
PRSTAASI ,  that a higher percentage of stations (excluding the respondent ) choosing, 
for example, a Black format , makes it more likely that the respondent ' s  station also 
engages in Black programming. This is true for Spanish and Asian programming as well . 
Thus ,  Hypothesis 4 (b ) is accepted , while Hypothesi s  4 (a) is rej ected. 70 
Looking now at the effects of owner-managers of a given minority-type on program­
ming (BLKOM, SPAOM,  ASIOM, FOM, OM ) , we find no discernable effects across the 
columns ,  even for the owner-managers variable; OM significantly reduces the targeting of 
70This result is somewhat at odds with the predictions from the basic economic theory of program­
ming choice. According to the basic theory, marginal programmers should be less likely to program 
a given format if there are more stations already programming that format. See "Justifying Minority 
Preferences ," supra note 31. Our empirical results likely stem from one of three sources. First, our 
survey analysis centers on inframarginal decisions, not just marginal ones. Hence, our results may tend 
to reflect average, rather than marginal tendencies. Second, the existence of a successful minority format 
programmer in a market may signal the possibility of earning a profit with that format in that mar­
ket, resolving uncertainty for other radio stations. Third, existing radio stations may shape listeners' 
preferences with their programming, rendering "copycat" programming more profitable. 
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Asian listeners , but increases Black programming and the targeting of female listeners . 
These results reveal no pattern. Further , minority owner-managers clearly have no sig­
nificant effect . Table 4 shows that Black owner-managers are no more likely to program 
for Blacks , Hispanic owner-managers are no more likely to program in Spanish, and so 
forth .  The ownership variables may produce key effects on the programming formats ,  but 
integrating minority owners into management has no effect on programming; Hypothesis 
5 is therefore rej ected. 71 
Regarding the other indicator variables , noncommercial stat ions universally programmed 
more for minority groups across all of the models .  Also, the fact that a station li cense 
was acquired through a distress sale , a preference hearing, or a tax certificate does not 
seem to have a part icularly significant effect on the programming format , which seems to 
confirm Hypothesis 6. While some of the coefficients for the tax variables are significant , 
the effects are not present in a sufficiently consistent manner across the specification to 
lead us to conclude that these indicators have a significant effect on the programming 
format . 
To sum up the test of our hypotheses ,72 then , we have seen that minority ownership 
has a distinct and significant impact on minority programming . This is true even after we 
control for the composition of minorities in the marketplace. Programming also responds 
to composition of minorities in the marketplace . The magnitude of the coefficients for 
Black ownership on Black programming and Spanish ownership on Spanish programming 
are significantly larger than the coefficient for female ownership on female programming. 
We also see , however , that a greater degree of female ownership leads to increases in pro­
gramming targeted to several other minority groups .  Stations with female ownership  are 
more likely to program primarily for females , but are also likely to increase programming 
for Blacks , Hispanics , Asians and American Indians .  The combined effects are similar in 
magnitude to those for the minority group owners taken separately. Thus , an increase in 
female ownership will have an overall impact on minority programming of a magnitude 
similar to what one would expect to get from, for example , a larger degree of Black own­
ership on Black programming. To increase Black programming it may be more effective 
to increase the number of Black owners . To increase minority programming overall it 
would be at least as effective to increase the number of female owners . We did not find 
71 It is possible that some difference in the way owner-managers and hired managers filled out the 
FCC survey masked some underlying true differences in programming. For example, if female owner­
managers tended to program more for minority audiences than did female owners who did not manage 
their stations, but female owner-managers reported their programming honestly, while female owners 
hired managers who over reported the degree to which the stations programmed for minorities, then 
it would be possible that the survey data would show no effect, despite the truth to the contrary. We 
regard the difference in reporting hypothesis as possible, but unlikely. At this stage the burden of proof 
must shift to those who would defend the integration of ownership with management policies at the FCC 
to demonstrate a real effect. 
72We get similar results from the logit utilizing the ownership variables clustering from 10% to 20%, 
from 20% to 50%, and greater than 50%. These c a n  be found in Table 3. 
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that increasing the number of radio stations in a market increased the amount of minor­
ity programming, but we did find that radio stat ions may be using the presence of other 
stations in the market which program for minorities as a signal to guide the stations in 
their programming choices . As the percentage of other stations programming for a given 
minority group increases , the likelihood that the respondent ' s  stat ion will program for 
that minority group increases , as well . Finally, we found no effects from the integration 
of ownership and management . 
4 Implicat ions 
There are at least three important implications of the results in section IV. First , one 
can make a strong argument that the minority preference policies are an effective method 
of producing some types of diversity in programming. Numerous problems inherent in 
the FCC survey prevent us from being as certain about this conclusion as we might 
be .  The FCC survey failed to include any definition of minority programming, relying 
on respondents to make what they wished of crucial survey terminology. In addition 
responses were never cross-checked against underlying facts ,  so it is  possible that the 
responses reflected nothing more than differing rates of perception between respondents 
with minority owners and respondents with no minority owners . However, our own 
comparison of aggregate results from the FCC survey data and from Arbitron data tends 
to confirm the reliability of the FCC survey. 73 All things considered, we believe that the 
results probably contain a significant amount of validity. 
Does our analysis of the FCC survey data support normative arguments for the mi­
nority preference policies? The answer depends upon which arguments supporting the 
minority preferences one considers . To see this consider the various arguments for mi­
nority preferences . There are two basic types of arguments for the minority preference 
policies : reparations and freedom of speech . The reparations idea starts with a claim 
that the FCC discriminated against women and minorities when it distributed radio and 
televis ion rights from 1927 (the inception of the Federal Radio Act ) to (at least ) the 
1 960 ' s .  To correct this injustice the argument runs ,  the FCC should do something to 
increase the number of broadcasting station owned by women and minorities . 74 The 
minority preference policies , which are supposed to produce such an increase, respond 
directly to the need for corrective justice. Such an argument , based on righting historical 
wrongs ,  would not use the evidence about the connection between the race or sex of a 
broadcaster and his or her choice of programming. Hence, if someone were to rely on a 
reparations argument to justify minority preferences in broadcasting, this article ' s  data 
analysis would neither support nor undermine the normative argument for the minority 
preferences . 
73See discussion in note 71, supra. 
74See "Justifying Minority Preferences,'' supra note 3 1. 
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Freedom of speech arguments can also be used to support the minority preference 
policies ,  and some of them draw strength from our data analysi s .  One version of freedom 
of speech centers on individual rights to communicate and exchange ideas , free of govern­
mental control or manipulation. 75 This version of freedom of speech cannot easily be used 
to support minority preferences within a governmental scheme that allocates the right to 
broadcast administratively. Indeed , such a notion of freedom of speech might lead to a 
complete dismantling of governmental regulation of broadcasting. 76 An alternative ver­
sion of freedom of speech maintains that we value the freedom for its utility to our society 
in general , and in part icular to our democratic  form of government . Freedom of speech 
helps us to separate truth from falsehoods , to choose useful and effective ideas from the 
welter of gibberish and nonsense, and to advance the course of science. Such freedoms 
also help us to communicate with our representatives in Congress and the White House, 
to inform them of our desires and hopes, and to warn them of impending defeat at the 
polls should they fail to listen . We can also communicate with other citizens ,  telling them 
of our beliefs about good social policy, and about misfeasance by those in office. This 
version of freedom of speech can be used to fashion a plausible argument for minority 
preferences . The supportive argument begins with the assertion that to fully participate 
in society, all segments of society must be adequately served by communication , partic­
ularly from the mass media. Next , the argument claims that minorities and women are 
under served, and that the lack of service provides an impediment to full participation by 
minorities and women in the society. Consequently, government should do something to 
increase the service in our communications industry, including broadcasting, to minori­
ties and women . Minority and female owners will tend to program more for minority and 
female audiences than will white male owners . Hence , the minority preference policies , 
which are designed to increase the number of stations owned by minorities and women, 
will increase service to minorities and women, and reduce barriers to their full participa­
tion in society and democracy. Our data analysis could help to support such an argument 
75See generally Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Expression: A Critical Analysis ( 1 984) ; Lee C. Bollinger, 
Images of a Free Press ( 1 9 9 1 ) ;  Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry ( 1 982) ; Steven 
H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance ( 1 990) ; and C. Edwin Baker, Human 
Liberty and Freedom of Speech ( 1989 ) .  
76See Jonathan Emord, Freedom, Technology, and the First Amendment ( 1 9 9 1 ) .  There is a version of 
the individual freedom argument, married to the reparations argument, that conceivably might support 
minority preferences argument. Such an argument would proceed as follows: For many years the FCC 
unfairly discriminated against minority and female applicants for broadcasting licenses. The resulting 
distribution unfairly restricted the freedom of minorities and women to communicate and express their 
ideas. To correct this imbalance the FCC should now make sure that substantial numbers of broadcasting 
licenses end up in the hands of minorities and women. 
The problem with such an argument is that the freedom of speech occupying center stage in the 
argument is quintessentially individual in nature. One would have to find the people who were denied 
the licenses and give them licenses now. Many years have passed since the original unfairness, and most 
of those who were wronged are likely dead or in old-age homes. 
The alternative arguments, focussing on social democracy, have much more appeal. See discussion in 
text. 
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for minority preference policies . 77 
We take no position on the various normative beliefs , implicit or explicit in such 
an argument for minority preference policies . 78 Hence, we neither affirm nor reject the 
policies as a normative matter. 
Second , Judge Thomas ' opinion in Lamprecht v. FCC seems to have been based on 
some very primitive data analysis .  Judge Thomas claimed, based on tables like the ones in 
the Appendix to this article, that giving broadcast licenses to women was a comparatively 
ineffective method of producing diverse programming. Given Judge Thomas ' training as 
a lawyer, and given the limited resources of the courts ,  that may have been the best that 
could be done . However , this Article provides a significant advance over Judge Thomas ' 
analysi s ,  and shows that his conclusions were probably wrong. We show that once we 
control for the market, women program more for virtually all minority groups, as well as 
for women.  Giving licenses to women seems to be a very effective way of diversifying 
broadcasting content . It is possible that if Judge Thomas had these results at the time 
of decision , his legal opinion may well have been different . 79 
Third, the FCC' s  reliance on integration of ownership with management as a primary 
criterion for awarding broadcast licenses seems to be seriously misguided . We could find 
no effect from integration of ownership into management . This result was clearest for 
minority owners , but also seemed to be true for nonminority owners . Hence , integration 
of ownership with management is generally irrelevant to programming, at least in any 
way the FCC might find desirable. This leaves only the argument that integrated owners 
will be more attentive to FCC rules and regulations-a pretty thin argument for choosing 
one applicant over another. In short , the burden of proof should now shift to those who 
would argue in favor of retaining the integration criterion . 
77 As we indicated at note 6 1 ,  supra, it is possible that minorities or women could use the same 
formats as white males, but present the formats in somewhat different fashions. For example, a female 
owner might present the news with a female point of view, yet fail to report that she uses a distinctive 
format, or that she targets women listeners. Such a possibility means that there may be some potentially 
measurable data that could further support such an argument for minority preferences. 
78In particular, using the race or sex of an individual to award valuable governmental rights and bene­
fits, when that particular individual has not been shown to have been harmed by any prior governmental 
or private discrimination, is highly controversial. We take no position on this issue. In addition, there 
is the distinction between the quantity of programming offered and the amount actually viewed. Pub­
lic access cable television, for example, could be justified on a similar argument to the one in text for 
minority programming. However, viewership of access channels is infinitesimal, rendering any argument 
for access programming on cable television highly problematic. 
79It is the responsibility of litigants, not the judge, to provide complex and sophisticated data analyses 
to the court. Our comment on Judge Thomas' opinion should not be read so as to fault him in any way 
for having failed to produce the sort of data analysis contained in this Article. 
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APPENDIX A 
Percent of Stations in Ownership Groups 
Programming for Target Groups 
1 % to 1 00% Ownership 
Programming Target Groups 
Black Hisp Asian/Pac Ind/ Alask Women Child Seniors 
Owner Groups 
No Min. 20 1 0  3 4 1 8  1 8  2 3  
Black 65 22 15 1 1  42 3 1  29 
Hispanic 35 59 15 17 42 29 27 
Asians/Pacific 25 28 1 6  9 30 17  19  
Indian/ Alask 29 8 6 32 50 51 46 
Women 26 13 5 5 35 20 26 
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Ownership Interests 
Blacks 
Hispanics 
Asians /Pacific 
Islanders 
Indians 
Alaskans 
Women 
5 1 to 1 00% 
0 
5 1 to 100% 
0 
5 1 to 100% 
0 
5 1  to 1 00% 
0 
5 1 to 1 00% 
0 
APPENDIX B 
Table 1 
Percentage That Broadcast Relevant Programming 
79% Black programming 
20 
7 4 % Hispanic 
1 0  
25% Asians/Pacific 
3 
46% Indian/ Alaskan 
4 
35% Women's 
2S 
(Source: Minority Programming figure 5A, at 14; figure 6A, at 1 5 ;  figure 7 A, at 1 6 ;  
figure SA,  at 1 7 ;  figure 9A ,  at l S . )  
Ownership Interests  
Blacks 
Hispanics 
Asians /Pacific 
Islanders 
Indians/ 
Alaskans 
Women 
51 to 100% 
1 to 50% 
5 1 to 100% 
1 to 50% 
5 1 to 100% 
1 to 50% 
5 1 to 100% 
1 to 50% 
5 1 to 100% 
1 to 50% 
Table 2 
Percentage That Broadcast Relevant Programming 
79% Black programming 
60 
74% Hispanic 
53 
25% Asians/Pacific 
14  
46% Indian/ Alaskan 
23 
35% Women 's 
35 
( Source: Minority Programming figure 5A,  at 14 ; figure 6A,  at 15 ; figure 7 A, at 1 6 ;  
figure SA ,  at 1 7 ;  figure 9A ,  at l S . )  
2 5  
Table 3 
Five Large Cities: 
(New York , Los Angeles , Chicago , Dallas , Atlanta) 
Ownership Interests (1 to 100%) % That Broadcast Women's  Programming 
1. Hispanics 59% 
2 .  Asians/Pacific Islanders 50 
3 .  Indians/ Alaskans 50 
4 .  Blacks 42 
5 .  Women 33 
6 . Non-minorities 27 
(Source: Minority Programming at 65) 
Table 4 
All  Cities 
Ownership Interests (1 to 100%)  % That Broadcast Women's  Programming 
1. Indians/ Alaskans 50% 
2 .  Hispanics 42 
3 .  Blacks 42 
4 .  Women 35 
5. Asians/Pacific Islanders 30 
6 .  Non-women (Men) 28 
(Source : Minority Programming figure 9A, at 18) 
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Table 5 
All Cities 
Ownership Interests  (1  to 1 00%) % That Broadcast Women's  Programming 
1 .  Indians/ Alaskans 50% 
2 .  Hispanics 49 
3 .  Blacks 47 
4 .  Asians/Pacific Islanders 35 
5 .  Women 35 
6 . Non-women (Men) 28 
( Source : Minority Programming figure 9A, at 18 )  
Table 6 
All Cities  
Ownership Interest s  (1  to 100%) % That Broadcast Asian/Pacific Programming 
1 .  Asian/Pacific Islanders 16% 
2 .  Hispanics 49 
3 .  Blacks 1 1  
4 .  Indians/ Alaskans 6 
5 .  Women 5 
6 .  Non-Asians /Pacific Islanders 3 
( Source : Minority Programming figure 7 A ,  at 16 )  
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Table 7 
All Cities 
Ownership Interests  (1 to 1 00%) % That Broadcast Hispanic Programming 
1 .  Hispanics 59% 
2 . Asians/Pacific Islanders 28 
3 .  Blacks 22 
4 .  Women 1 3  
5 .  Non-Hispanics 1 0  
6 .  Indians/ Alaskans 8 
(Source : Minority Programming figure 6A,  at 1 5 )  
Ownership Interests ( 1  t o  100%)  
1 .  Asians/Pacific Islanders 
2. Hispanics
3. Blacks
4. Asians/Pacific Islanders
5. Women
6. Non-Indians/ Alaskans
Table 8 
All Cities 
% That Broadcast Indian/ Alaskan Programming 
32% 
1 7  
9 
9 
5 
4 
(Source: Minority Programming figure SA ,  at 1 7 . )  
28 
Table 9 
All Cities 
Ownership Interests (1  to 100%) % That Broadcast Black Programming 
1 .  Blacks 65% 
2. Hispanics 35 
3 . Indians/ Alaskans 29 
4. Women 26 
5 .  Asians/Pacific Islanders 25 
6 .  Non-Blacks 20 
(Source : Minority Programming figure 6A ,  at 15 )  
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Table 1 0  
Ten Most Used Formats (of 22 )  
Non-Minorities Women 
1 .  Religious 1 .  Religious 
2 .  Adult Contemporary 2 . Adult Contemporary
3 .  Country & Western 3 .  Country & Western 
4 .  Talk 4 .  All News 
5 .  Agriculture & Farm 5 .  Talk 
6 .  All New 6 .  Agriculture & Farm 
7 .  Golden Oldies 7 .  Golden Oldies 
8 .  Other 8 .  Other 
9 .  Education 9 .  Education 
1 0 .  Middle of the Road 1 0 .  Jazz 
Two Least Used Formats (of 22) 
1 .  Foreign Language 1 .  Foreign Language 
2 .  American Indian 2 .  American Indian 
(Source : Minority Programming table 3, at 38 . )  
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APPENDIX C 
M I NORITY OWNERSHIP S U RVEY 
I n  order to d etermine the effects of its minority and female ownership policies, the Federal 
Communications Commission needs information on the sex and race or ethnic background of 
broadcast station owners. Please answer the following questions and return this form by April 30, 
1 987 to Federal Communications Commission, Room 822, 1 91 9  M Street N.W. , Washington, DC 
20554, Attention: Minority Ownership Study. 
Station Call Letters Community of License Class of Service 
AM FM TV 
Commercial 
N on-commercial 
A. Do women or members of racial or ethnic minority g roups hold ownership interests in  this 
station? (If the answer if Yes, complete the rest of the form. If  the answer is No, skip to question 
E.) 
Yes No 
B .  If  members of racial or  ethnic minority groups hold ownership i nterests in  this station, g ive the 
percentage i nterest held by each g roup. See page 4 for d efinitions of minority g roups. 
\ M I NO R ITY GROUP 
1 .  Black, not of  H ispanic origin 
2. H ispanic
3. American I nd ian or Alaskan Native
4. Asian or Pacific I slander
5. M I NORITY TOTAL
PERCENTAG E I NTER EST 
If  this constitutes a 
control l ing interest, 
check here. 
C. If women hold ownership interests in  this station, g ive the percentage interest held by women. 
If  this constitutes a 
controlling interest, 
check here. 
D. When this station was acquired by the current owners, were any of the fol lowing F.C.C. policies 
i nvolved? 
1 .  Distress sale 
2. P reference for women or minority g roup
members in  comparative hearings
3. Tax certificate
Yes 
E. Do owners of this station hold management positions with the station? 
Yes 
No 
No 
F. For each owner who holds a management position with this station, g ive the title of the 
management position and the percentage share of ownership the person holds. Check the 
appropriate column for the n umber of hours worked per week. State the person's minority group 
membership, if  any, and the person's sex. Check if the person has previous broadcast experience. 
% H ours per Week P revious 
Owner- Minority B road cast 
Job Title ship 1 -1 9  20-39 40 + G roup S ex Experience 
G. Format (rad io stations only) .  In Col umn I, check types of programming this station broadcasts 
for m ore than 20 hours per week. I n  Col umn I I ,  check types of programming this station 
b roadcasts, but for l ess than 20 hours per week. Check all that apply. 
I .  I I .  I .  I I  
2 0  + 1 -1 9  20 + 1 -1 9  
Hours Hours Hours Hours 
1 . __ Adult Contemporary 1 2. Golden Oldies 
2. __ Agriculture & Farm 1 3. Jazz 
3.  Al l  News 1 4. Middle of the Road 
4. American I ndian 1 5. == P rogressive
5.  Beautiful Music 1 6. __ Religious 
6. == Big Band 1 7. __ Spanish 
7. Black 1 8. Tal k 
8.  Classical 1 9. == Top 40
9. == Country & Western 20. Urban Contemporary 
1 0. Educational 2 1 . Variety 
1 1 . == Foreign Language 22. Other 
{other than Spanish) 
H. Is the programming of this station directed primarily to any of the fol lowing groups? I f  not, 
d oes the station provide any special programming d irected specifical ly to member of these 
groups? Check the number of programming hours appl icable. 
G R O U P  
\ 
1 .  Black 
2. Hispanics
3. Asians or Pacific
I slanders 
4. American I nd ians or
Alaskan Natives 
5. Combinations of
Minority G roups 
6. Foreign Language
S peakers 
{Non-H ispanic) 
7. Women
8. Children
9. Senior Citizens
PRI MARY 
AUDI ENCE 
I .  
20 + 
Hours 
I I .  
1 -1 9  
Hours 
S PECIAL 
PROGRAM M I NG 
I .  
20 + 
Hours 
I I .  
1 -1 9  
Hours 
Table 2 
Descriptive Stat ist ics 
1lllllf lill,ll�l�1111·1;111[1111111111111111·111,l1lllll.ll!lll1l,llll!llll1!ll�1=1�11111 1111r. 1111t111.11'-lllllll lf 1lllllll.lllllllll'll 
OWN B 1 0 92 
OWNB20 60 
OWNB50 1 56 
OWNS 1 0 27 
OWNS20 27 
OWNS50 75 
OWN l 1 0 9 
OWN l20 1 2  
OWN l50  32 
OWNA1 0 9 
OWNA20 1 0  
OWNA50 1 0
OWNF 1 0 1 740 
OWNF50 920 
D IS  5 1  
PRE 72 
TAX 63 
NCOM 1 01 9
BLKOM 9 1  
SPAOM 49 
ASIOM 2 
FOM 643 
OM 3 1 1 3
BLKFOR 81 0 
PRI BLK 905 
SPAFOR 482 
PRISPA 426 
AS I FOR 3 1 6  
P RIAS I 85 
PR I FEM 1 369 
PRIAM I 1 23 
N umber of Observations 7462 
PERBLK 0 84.2 
PERS PA 0 82 .7 
PE RAS I 0 67.7 
RSTA 1 74 
P RSTABLK 0 1 00 
PRSTASPA 0 1 00 
PRSTAAS I 0 1 00 
OWNB 0 1 00 
OWNS 0 1 00 
OWN I 0 1 00 
OWNA 0 1 00 
OWNF 0 1 00 
9 .83 1 2. 8  
3 .89  8 .61  
1 . 1 5 4 .46 
1 0.4 1  1 2. 5 5  
1 0 . 1 8  1 8 .35  
5 . 96 1 3 .23 
4 .03 1 1 . 1 3
2 .37 1 3 .48 
1 . 03 8 .8  
0 .47 6 . 33 
0 . 1 9 3 . 38 
1 4 .39  23.66 
VARIABLE 
cons 
ownb1 0 
ownb20 
ownb50 
owns1 0 
owns20 
owns50 
owni1 0  
owni20 
owni50 
owna1 0  
owna20 
owna50 
ownf1 0 
ownf50 
dis 
pre 
tax 
ncom 
perblk 
perspa 
perasi 
rsta 
prstablk 
prstaspa 
prstaasi 
blkom 
spa om 
asiom 
tom 
om 
log l ikel ihood (in itial) 
log l ikelihood (at conv) 
number of observations 
percent correctly predicted 
(t-statistics) are below the parameter estimates 
* denotes significance at the 90% level 
• •  denotes significance at the 95% level 
Table 3 
ASIF OR P RIASI 
-4. 1 79 - -5.51 6 •• 
(27.745) (1 8.498) 
0.032 -1 .61 3 
(0.068) (1 .550) 
0.055 -0.1 1 2  
(0.099) (0 . 1 72) 
0.280 -2.703 
(0.456) (1 . 1 66) 
1 .4 1 7  •• -9.403 
(2 .31 9) (0.057) 
0.81 9 -9.531 
(1 . 1 06) (0.066) 
1 .0 1 7  • -0 . 1 33 
(1 .862) (0 . 1 24) 
-8.322 -1 0.701 
(0.081 ) (0.034) 
-8.81 0 -9.060 
(0.1 08) (0.039) 
1 . 1 24 • -9.508 
(1 .733) (0.064) 
1 . 1 74 -1 2.726 
(1 .305) (0.050) 
1 .037 -1 2 . 1 92 
(1 . 1 83) (0.072) 
3.01 1 •• 0.535 
(3.465) (0.426) 
-0.047 o.m •• 
(0.295) (2.91 7) 
-0.365 1 .028 -
(1 .524) (2.754) 
0.552 0.567 
(0.909) (0.469) 
0. 1 55 -13 .568 
(0.239) (0. 1 24) 
-1 .539 2 . 1 1 3  •• 
(1 .340) (2.439) 
1 .054 •• 2.032 -
(6.629) (7.669) 
-0.452 -1 . 1 93 
(0.745) (0.993) 
-1 .960 • -1 .371 
(1 .757) (0.751 ) 
1 .257 6.71 6 •• 
(1 .389) (7.978) 
0.024 •• -0.01 6 
(6.809) (1 .579) 
0.372 1 .01 3 . 
(1 .042) (1 .806) 
0.489 2.028 •• 
(1 .008) (3 .044) 
4.734 •• 2.430 •• 
(1 5.296) (4. 1 1 2) 
-1 .51 5  3.359 
(1 .308) (1 .443) 
-0.389 -8. 1 30 
(0.560) (0 .070) 
-0.1 1 6  1 1 .089 
(0.067) (0. 1 43) 
0.834 •• 0.743 
(3 . 1 87) (1 . 1 55) 
0. 1 68 -1 .256 •• 
(1 .056) (2 .887) 
-51 72.300 -51 72.300 
-1 094.70 -365.07 
7462 7462 
95 .91 98.83 
PRIFEM P RIAM I 
-1 .703 •• -4.308 -
(24.899) (1 8.424) 
-0.744 - -1 .072 
(2.328) (1 .51 1 ) 
-0. 1 28 -0.040 
(0.388) (0.052) 
-0.471 0.270 
(1 .399) (0.264) 
0.999 •• 2 .2 1 0  •• 
(2.293) (3.045) 
-0.61 7 1 .250 
(0.948) (1 .431 ) 
-0.907 . 1 . 1 50 
(1 .780) (1 .643) 
1 .858 •• 2.226 •• 
(2.538) (2.725) 
-1 .21 1 2 . 1 23 •• 
(1 . 1 33) (1 .975) 
-0.082 3.748 •• 
(0. 1 78) (7.841 ) 
-8.784 -7.642 
(0. 1 1 6) (0.060) 
-0. 1 49 -9.038 
(0. 1 82) (0.073) 
-1 0.042 -7.838 
(0. 1 1 6) (0.057) 
0.2 1 4  •• 0.628 •• 
(2.801 ) (2 .730) 
0.422 •• 0.688 •• 
(4. 1 45) (2. 1 43) 
0.780 •• -7.42 1 
(2.382) (0. 1 30) 
-0.351 -0.742 
(1 .022) (0.764) 
1 .441 •• 1 .486 • •  
(4.56 1 ) (1 .995) 
0.596 • •  1 .579 • •  
(6 .405) (6.8 1 0) 
-0.530 •• -8.809 -
(1 .987) (4.752) 
-0.729 -2.364 
(1 .623) (1 .542) 
-4.673 •• -2.833 
(2 .5 1 8) (0.552) 
-0.01 0 •• -0.028 • •  
(3.230) (2 . 1 25) 
0.4 1 9  •• 1 . 1 08 • •  
(2 .5 1 5) (2 .391 ) 
0. 1 36 0 .645 
(0.520) (1 .000) 
-0.338 2 . 1 39 •• 
(1 . 1 41 ) (4.461 ) 
-0.337 0.868 
(0.782) (0 .61 7) 
0.454 0.896 
(0.81 2) (0.906) 
1 3.2 1 2  2 .8n 
(0. 1 53) (0.008) 
-0.01 9 0.337 
(0 . 1 58) (0.795) 
0.440 • •  -0.440 
(6 .2 1 0) (1 .545) 
-51 72 .300 -51 72 .300 
-3450.00 -495.64 
7462 7462 
81 .76 98.50 
VARIAB LE 
cons 
ownb1 0 
ownb20 
ownb50 
owns1 0  
owns20 
owns50 
owni1 0 
owni20 
owni50 
owna1 0  
owna20 
owna50 
ownf1 0 
ownf50 
dis 
pre 
tax 
ncom 
perblk 
perspa 
perasi 
rsta 
prstablk 
prstaspa 
prstaasi 
blkom 
spa om 
asiom 
fom 
om 
log l ikel ihood (in itial) 
log likelihood (at conv) 
number of observations 
percent correctly predicted 
(t-statistics) are below the parameter estimates 
* denotes significance at the 90% level 
** denotes significance at the 95% level 
Table 3 
B LKFOR PRIBLK 
-3.372 •• -3.3 1 4  .. 
(33.555) (33.3 1 7) 
-0. 1 22 0.024 
(0.421 ) (0.082) 
0.869 •• 0.61 5 •• 
(2 .939) (2.01 2) 
1 .775 .. 2.892 •• 
(6.237) (9.407) 
0.402 0.263 
(0.71 6) (0.437) 
1 .390 •• 0.497 
(2.667) (0.749) 
-0.968 -0.432 
(1 .267) (0.639) 
1 .254 -9.422 
(1 .625) (0.095) 
-0.365 -1 . 1 80 
(0.407) (0.985) 
0.5 1 3  -0.549 
(1 .01 4) (0.739) 
-0. 1 81 -8.960 
(0 .1 55) (0. 1 03) 
-0.398 -9. 1 31 
(0.344) (0.098) 
-7.737 1 . 1 48 
(0. 1 66) (1 .2 1 2) 
0. 1 55 0.290 •• 
(1 .503) (2.891 ) 
0.285 •• 0.364 •• 
(2.023) (2.647) 
0.691 • 0.371 
(1 .71 7) (0.825) 
0. 1 70 -0.029 
(0.464) (0.071 ) 
0.536 0.886 •• 
(1 .538) (2.224) 
1 .5 1 8  •• 1 .238 •• 
(1 4.350) (1 1 .24 1 )  
3 .360 •• 5.059 •• 
(1 2 .040) (1 8.593) 
-0.691 -2.424 • •  
(0.942) (2 .660) 
-0.982 -3 .201 
(0.685) (1 .376) 
0 .000 0.001 
(0.035) (0. 1 47) 
1 .839 •• 0.748 •• 
(1 0.458) (4.035) 
-0.268 -0.074 
(0.685) (0. 1 83) 
1 . 1 87 •• 0.928 •• 
(3.729) (2 .746) 
-0.050 0.462 
(0. 1 42) (1 . 1 33) 
-1 .695 -1 .721 
(1 .543) (1 .548) 
0.578 -9.620 
(0.005) (0.047) 
-0.077 -0.082 
(0.420) (0.477) 
0.207 • •  0.334 • •  
(2 .034) (3.448) 
-51 72.300 -51 72 .300 
-21 48.50 -2206.00 
7462 7462 
89. 1 9 88.93 
SP AF OR P RIS PA 
-3.690 • •  -3.983 •• 
(30.009) (29.334) 
0.677 •• -0.371 
(2.053) (0 .833) 
0.565 0. 1 07 
(1 .368) (0 .2 1 5) 
0.246 -0. 1 1 9  
(0.492) (0 .208) 
0.787 1 .854 •• 
(1 .557) (3.760) 
1 .963 •• 1 .900 •• 
(3.953) (3.705) 
3.053 • •  3.499 • •  
(8.327) (9. 1 51 ) 
-8.699 0.750 
(0.088) (0.694) 
-0.691 -9.461 
(0. 600) (0. 1 07) 
-0.640 -1 .871 
(0.678) (1 .520) 
-8.8 1 7  -9.039 
(0.094) (0.081 ) 
0.456 0.824 
(0.483) (0.841 ) 
1 .359 1 .9 1 7  • •  
(1 .501 ) (2 . 1 5 1 ) 
0.290 •• 0. 1 33 
(2 .273) (0.946) 
0 .444 •• 0 . 1 62 
(2.537) (0.81 1 ) 
-0.035 -0.631 
(0.051 ) (0.722) 
0.455 0.548
(0.957) (1 .061 ) 
-0. 1 50 0.41 7 
(0.264) (0.778) 
0.885 • •  1 . 1 77 •• 
(6 .443) (8.371 ) 
-1 .079 • -1 .839 •• 
(1 .882) (2.772) 
4 . 1 88 •• 6. 1 63 •• 
(9.726) (1 3. 1 32) 
-0.346 -0.684 
(0.257) (0.445) 
0.01 4 •• 0.021 • •  
(4.283) (6 .555) 
-0.461 0.430 
(1 .236) (1 . 1 65) 
2 .459 •• 0.739 •• 
(8.680) (2 . 009) 
1 .231 •• 1 .770 •• 
(3.208) (4 .597) 
-1 .770 -0.203 
(1 .593) (0.252) 
0 . 1 04 0.380 
(0.221 ) (0.790) 
1 .483 -1 0.749 
(0.8 1 6) (0.044) 
-0.532 •• -0.392 
(2 . 1 09) (1 .348) 
-0.020 -0.097 
(0. 1 56) (0 .660) 
-51 72 .300 -51 72 .300 
-1 441 .60 -1 242 .00 
7462 7462 
93.80 94.81 
Table 4 
VARIABLE BLKFOR 
cons -3.382 -
(-34.238) 
ownb 0.021  ** 
(6.792) 
owns -0.003 
(-0 .432) 
owni 0.007 
{1 .359) 
own a -0.01 8 
{-0.809) 
ownf 0.005 -
(2.695) 
dis 0.737 * 
{1 . 875) 
pre 0 . 1 65 
{0.444) 
tax 0.423 
{1 .21 4) 
ncom 1 .531 -
{1 5 .096) 
perblk 3 .375 ** 
{1 2 . 1 66) 
perspa -0 .433 
(-0 .61 2) 
perasi -0.940 
(-0.674) 
rsta 0.000 
(-0 .076) 
prstablk 1 .822 -
(1 0 .394) 
prstaspa -0.296 
(-0 .766) 
prstaasi 1 .202 -
{3 .784) 
blkom -0.226 
{-0 .633) 
spa om - 1 .674 
(-1 .522) 
asiom -3 .656 
{-0 .088) 
tom -0 . 1 36 
(-0 .732) 
om 0.220 -
(2 . 1 6 1 )  
log l i ke l ihood (in it ia l) -51 72 .30 
log l i ke l ihood {at conv) -21 54 . 1 0  
number of observations 7462 
percent correct ly pred icted 89 . 1 2  
(t-statistics) a re below the parameter estimates 
* denotes s ign ificance at the 90% level
** denotes sign ificance at the 95% level 
PRIBLK 
-3.283 -
(-33 .828) 
0 .034 -
(9.648) 
-0.004 
(-0 .586) 
·-0 .0 1 2
{-1 .208) 
0 .0 1 2  
{1 .046) 
0 .006 -
{3.243) 
0 .51 9 
{1 . 1 98) 
-0 . 1 1 8
{-0.287) 
0 .764 * 
{1 .851 )  
1 . 1 75 -
{1 1 . 1 38) 
5 .024 -
(1 8 .545) 
-2.206 -
(-2.473) 
-3.704 
(-1 .61 7) 
0 .000 
(0 . 1 1 9) 
0 .728 -
(3.929) 
-0 . 1 29 
(-0.320) 
0 .953 -
(2 .828) 
0 .203 
(0 .477) 
- 1 .605 
(-1 .434) 
-7.670 
(-0 .097) 
-0. 1 37 
(-0 .779) 
0 .347 -
(3 .579) 
-51 72.30 
-2205 .30 
7462 
88 .97 
S PAFOR PRIS PA 
-3.700 - -3.994 -
(-30.538) (-29.705) 
0 .008 * 0.001 
(1 .71 6) (0 . 1 69) 
0 .039 - 0.046 -
(8.833) {9 .34 1 )  
-0.007 -0.020 
{-0.766) (-1 .575) 
0 .020 - 0.027 -
{2.045) {2.705) 
0 .009 - 0.004 
(3.81 8) (1 .605) 
-0. 1 95 -0.801 
{-0.28 1 )  {-0.865) 
0 .424 0.388 
{0.900) (0.749) 
-0.335 0 .364 
{-0 .554) {0.650) 
0.980 - 1 . 1 97 ** 
{7.509) (8.727) 
- 1 .044 * - 1 .929 ** 
{- 1 .830) (-2.905) 
4 .21 2 - 6 .242 ** 
(9.769) (1 3 .302) 
-0.784 - 1 . 1 61 
(-0 .588) (-0 .762) 
0 .01 4 - 0.021 -
(4 .235) (6.56 1 )  
-0.507 0 .442 
(-1 .365) (1 . 1 97) 
2.435 - 0.693 * 
(8 .568) (1 . 880) 
1 .249 - . 1 .759 ** 
(3 .267) (4 .568) 
-2.222 - -0.333 
{-2 .01 2) {-0.41 0) 
0 . 1 93 0 .481 
{0 .398) (0.982) 
0 .948 -7.846 
(0.507) {-0 . 1 80) 
-0.571 - -0.395 
(-2.275) (-1 .368) 
-0.004 -0.082 
(-0.027) (-0 .554) 
-51 72.30 -51 72.30 
-1 437 .50 -1 235.50 
7462 7462 
93 .78 94 .84 
Table 4 
VARIABLE ASIFOR 
cons -4. 1 74 -
(-28.424) 
ownb 0.006 
(0 .987) 
owns 0 .01 0 
(1 .590) 
own i  0 .01 1 
(1 .648) 
own a 0 .034 -
(3 .275) 
ownf -0.002 
(-0.639) 
d is 0 .624 
(1 .073) 
pre 0 .004 
(0.006) 
tax - 1 .754 
(-1 .446) 
ncom 1 .055 -
(6 .852) 
perblk -0.532 
(-0.879) 
perspa - 1 .71 1 
(-1 .58 1 )  
perasi 1 .442 .. 
(1 .71 4) 
rsta 0 .023 -
(6.670) 
prstablk 0 .363 
(1 .01 9) 
prstaspa 0.477 
(1 .000) 
prstaasi 4 .727 -
(1 5 .356) 
blkom - 1 .757 
(-1 . 523) 
spa om -0 . 1 45 
(-0 .209) 
asiom -0.508 
(-0 .278) 
fom 0.697 -
(2.660) 
om 0. 1 66
(1 .044) 
log l i ke l ih ood (in i t ia l) -51 72.30 
log l i ke l ihood (at conv) - 1 1 00 . 1 0
n u m be r  of observations 7462 
percent correctly predicted 95 . 93 
(t-statist ics) are below the parameter est imates 
* denotes s ign ificance at the 90% level
** denotes s ign ifica nce at the 95% level 
PRIAS I ' 
-5.373 -
(-1 9.04 1 )  
-0 .01 7 
(- 1 .069) 
-0.003 
(-0.209) 
-0. 1 85 
(-0 .562) 
0.001 
(0.075) 
0 .01 6 -
(3.285) 
0 .731 
(0.646) 
- 1 4 .269 
(-0. 1 22) 
2.095 -
(2.420) 
1 .932 -
(7.41 2) 
- 1 .280 
(- 1 .067) 
- 1 .746 
(-0.941 ) 
5.886 -
(7.035) 
-0.01 5 
(-1 .443) 
0 .967 .. 
(1 .728) 
2.009 -
(3 .039) 
2.486 -
(4.257) 
2.458 
(1 .380) 
-8. 1 97 
(-0.067) 
1 1 . 947 
(0. 1 44) 
0.6 1 0 
(0.942) 
- 1 .224 -
(-2.828) 
-51 72.30 
-372.46 
7462 
98.82 
PRIFEM PRIAM! 
-1 .696 - -4. 1 93 -
(-25.400) (-1 8 .841 ) 
-0.006 * -0.003 
(-1 .70 1 )  (-0 .254) 
-.0.003 0 .01 5 * 
(-0.643) (1 .882) 
0 .001 0 .038 * 
(0. 1 49) (7.685) 
-0.025 -0.021 
(-1 .373) (-0 .379) 
0.007 - 0.01 0 * 
(4.680) (2. 549) 
0 .752 - -7.535 
(2.31 3) (-0 . 1 4 1 )  
-0.406 -0.293 
(-1 . 1 85) (-0 .325) 
1 .452 - 1 .803 -
(4.595) (2. 524) 
0 .584 ** 1 .665 -
(6.483) (7. 385) 
-0.570 - -8.879 -
(-2. 1 45) (-4.854) 
-0.748 .. -2. 1 79 
(-1 .668) (-1 .467) 
-4.794 - -2.532 
(-2.606) (-0.606) 
-0.01 0 - -0.029 -
(-3.077) (-2.247) 
0.41 5 - 1 . 1 1 7 -
(2.498) (2.451 )  
0 . 1 1 8 0.600 
(0 .453) (0.942) 
-0.334 2 . 1 1 6  -
(-1 . 1 3 1 )  (4.421 )  
-0.21 7 1 .2 1 1 
(-0.495) (0.825) 
-0. 1 07 0.795 
(-0.21 2) (0 .809) 
5.686 - -3.279 
(2.284) (-0 .01 0) 
-0.046 0 .355 
(-0.375) (0. 825) 
0.451 - -0.436 
(6 .358) (-1 .528) 
-51 72.30 -51 72.30 
-3460.50 -507.53 
7462 7462 
8 1 .69 98.43 
Table 5 
TOBIT MODEL FOR AGG REGATE PERCENTAG E O F  B LACK FORMAT RADIO STATIONS 
VARIABLE 
constant -0.26068 ** 
(7 .20 1 ) 
Percentage Blacks i n  Populat ion 0 .921 67 ** 
(5.280) 
Percentage Non-Nommercial 0 .32342 ** 
(3 .594) 
Percentage B lack Owned Stations 0 .34753 ** 
(2 .7 1 7) 
Sigma**2 0 . 1 631 3 ** 
(9 .972) 
auxil iary statistics 
log l ike l ihood (in it ia l) -760.3  
log  l i ke l ihood (at conv) -327.24 
number of observations 6 1 1 
TOBIT MODEL FOR AGGREGATE PERCENTAG E O F  HISPANIC FORMAT RADI O  STATIONS 
constant 
Percentage H ispan ics in Populat ion 
Percentage Non-Nommercia l  
Percentage H ispan ic  Owned Stations 
auxi l iary statistics 
log l i ke l ihood (in it ia l) 
log l i ke l ihood (at conv) 
number of observations 
t-statist ics a re below the parameter est imates 
* denotes sign ificance at the 90% level
** denotes s ign ificance at the 95% level 
Sigma**2 
-0.28 1 09 ** 
(8 .265) 
1 .671 3 1  ** 
(6 .783) 
-0 .006 
(0 .066) 
0 .51 21 4 ** 
(2 . 1 82) 
0 . 1 1 879 ** 
(7 .883) 
-239 .22 
-91 7 .09 
6 1 1 
